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DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  
THE REVISED TREATY OF CHAGUARAMAS AND THE 
CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
– COMPATIBILITY OR CONTROVERSY? 
 
By 
The Hon. Mme. Justice Desiree P. Bernard, O.R., C.C.H., 
Judge, Caribbean Court of Justice 
 
 
 
 
  The collapse of the West Indian Federation in the early 1960s 
seemed then to have sounded the death knell to the dreams of the 
Caribbean Region for a united political and economic powerhouse hopefully 
achieving collectively what may have seemed impossible individually for 
small states with fragile economies based mainly on tourism, sugar and 
banana production controlled by the former colonial masters.  All, however, 
was not lost when the political leaders of the day once again endeavoured to 
promote the economic development of the Region by establishing the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (hereinafter referred to as “CARIFTA”) in 
19651 with objectives to increase and expand trade between Member States 
thereby fostering harmonious development and liberalisation, and ensuring 
fair competition.  
  This tentative attempt at regional economic cooperation matured  
                                       
1 Founded by Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados and Guyana on 15 December, 1965, with the signing of the 
Dickenson Bay Agreement, and later joined by Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 
St. Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat, Jamaica and Belize. 
 
 
with the establishment of the Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market signed on July 4, 1973 by all 
Member States of the Region.2  The vision of the signatories went beyond 
trade, and embraced the optimum utilisation of available human and 
natural resources of the Region by co-ordinated and sustained economic 
development.  The Community’s objectives embraced economic integration, 
coordination of foreign policies and functional cooperation with the Annex to 
the Treaty establishing the Common Market Council on which each Member 
State was represented. The Council’s responsibilities can be summarised as 
being administrative (ensuring the efficient operation and development of 
the Common Market), supervisory (making proposals for the progressive 
development of the Common Market), adjudicatory (receiving and 
considering alleged breaches of obligations arising under the Annex and 
deciding thereon), and exercising such powers and performing such duties 
as were conferred upon it. 
        The response to the global economic challenges of the late 1980s which 
the Heads of Governments of the Caribbean Community anticipated would 
impact significantly on their fragile economies, together with a commitment 
to deepen regional integration, resulted in the Declaration of Grande Anse in 
1989 establishing an independent Commission under the Chairmanship of 
Sir Shridath Ramphal, later Secretary General of the Commonwealth. This 
Commission produced in 1992 a report intituled appropriately “Time for 
Action” and embracing wide-ranging recommendations, among them being 
                                       
2 Signed at Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago by Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
rapid development of a Single Market and Economy. This led ultimately in 
2001 to the signing and adoption of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy3 (hereinafter referred to as the “RTC”). 
  What will forever be regarded as a recommendation of 
outstanding significance coming out of that Commission led eventually to  
the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to 
as the “CCJ”), a regional court which had been contemplated in several 
forms and by several regional groups over a considerable period of time. The 
Regional Heads of Government as Contracting Parties being “convinced that 
the Caribbean Court of Justice will have a determinative role in the further 
development of Caribbean jurisprudence through the judicial process,” 
brought into force an Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of 
Justice4 (hereinafter referred to as “the CCJ Agreement”) which provided for 
two jurisdictions – original and appellate.  
     Upon signing the RTC the States Parties affirmed that the 
original jurisdiction of the Court was essential for the successful operation 
of the Single Market and Economy, and provision was made in the RTC for 
the Court to have compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the 
RTC5.  Further, and of significant importance is the fact that the Member 
States agree that they recognise as compulsory, ipso facto and without 
                                       
3 Signed on July 5, 2001 in Nassau, Bahamas by Heads of Government of the Community 
4 Signed on February 14, 2001 in Barbados 
5 Article 211 
 
 
special agreement, the Court’s original jurisdiction.6 Each Member State 
also undertook to employ its best endeavours to complete as soon as 
possible the constitutional and legislative procedures required for its 
participation in the regime establishing the Court.7  
  Separate and apart from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on 
the CCJ under the RTC, both Treaties of 1973 and 2001 established 
procedures for settlement of disputes between Member States wherever 
these arose.  Even before these treaties their forerunner, the CARIFTA 
Agreement of 1965 established a procedure for settlement of disputes 
between the three States which had signed that Agreement. This is a 
convenient point of departure to initiate a discussion on settlement of 
disputes between States as provided for in the Treaties. 
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association  
 
  This Agreement signed on 15th December, 1965 by the 
Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Guyana (then British 
Guiana), sought, inter alia, to promote the expansion and diversification of 
trade within the areas of the Member Territories, collectively called the 
Caribbean Free Trade Area. This was based on the recognition that they 
shared a common determination to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the 
peoples of the Caribbean for full employment and improved living standards; 
also an awareness that the broadening of domestic markets through the 
elimination of barriers to trade between the Territories was a prerequisite of 
                                       
6 Article 216   
7 Article 224 
 
 
 development.8 
  The Agreement’s Complaints Procedure9 provided for referral of 
disagreements or complaints by Member Territories to a Council comprising 
the institution and organs of the Association with power to make 
arrangements for examining the matter, and in so doing to have regard to 
whether it had been established that an obligation under the Agreement had 
not been fulfilled or any objective of the Association was being frustrated.  
The arrangements referred to included a reference to an examining 
committee comprising persons of competence and integrity, and appointed 
on such terms and conditions as were to be decided by the majority vote of 
the Council. 
  The responsibilities of the Council embraced exercising such 
powers and functions as were conferred upon it by the Agreement, 
supervising the application of the Agreement and keeping its operation 
under review, as well as considering any further action by Member 
Territories to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Association.10  
In exercising its responsibility under the Complaints Procedure, the Council 
was empowered to take decisions and make recommendations which bound 
all Member Territories. 
 
Treaty Establishing The Caribbean Community and Common Market  
  By 1973 when the Caribbean Common Market was established 
                                       
8 Preamble of the Agreement and Article 2. 
9 Article 26 
10 Article 28 
 
 
membership had expanded to twelve independent Caribbean States and 
Montserrat.11 
  This Treaty with similar aspirations as CARIFTA provided for 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty to be  
determined by the Conference, one of the principal organs of the Community 
unless otherwise provided for.12 
 
  The Disputes Procedure within the Common Market as set out 
in the Annex13 adopted criteria similar to Article 26 of the CARIFTA 
Agreement, for the referral of disputes to the Common Market Council,14 the 
other organ of the Community, where a Member State considered that any 
benefit conferred upon it by the Annex or any objective of the Common 
Market was being or may be frustrated with no satisfactory settlement 
having been reached between the Member States concerned. 
 
  Among the powers exercisable by the Council was referral to an 
ad hoc Tribunal constituted in accordance with Article 12 of the Annex and 
comprising qualified jurists as arbitrators drawn from a list maintained by 
the Secretary General, and to which every Member State was invited to 
nominate two persons.  If either the Council or the Tribunal found that any 
benefit conferred on a Member State or any objective of the Common Market 
was being or may have been frustrated, the Council could by majority vote 
make appropriate recommendations to the Member State concerned.  
                                       
11 Membership was also open to any other state of the Caribbean Region that is, in the opinion of the Conference 
of the Community able and willing to exercise the rights and assume the obligations of membership in accordance 
with Article 29 of the Treaty. 
12 Article 19. 
13 Article 11 
14 Article 5 of the Annex 
 
 
Failure or inability to comply with  such recommendations could result in 
the Council by majority vote authorising any Member State to suspend its 
obligations to the offending State as the Council considered appropriate. 
Provision was made for any Member State at any time while any matter is 
under consideration to request the Council to authorise interim measures to 
safeguard its position.  
 
  Sheldon McDonald in his literary work, “CARICOM and the New 
Millennium: Dispute Settlement Put Right”15 emphasised the fact that after 
such an involved procedure the only sanction was a non-binding 
recommendation, and unlike the Treaty proper, the Member State was 
under no duty to explain its failure to comply with the recommendation; 
further, whereas all decisions and recommendations under the Treaty 
required unanimity, this recommendation was by majority vote. 
  
  Mr. Mc Donald further commented on the fact that Member 
States did not assume the automatic right to refer disputes to the Tribunal; 
instead this rested with the Council with the possibility that the majority 
could frustrate a request for such a reference even though legitimate.  
 
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) 
 
   The States Parties to the RTC16 having committed themselves to 
deepening regional economic integration through the establishment of the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) in order to achieve sustained 
                                       
15 See An analysis of the Dispute Settlement Regimes in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the 
Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market And Economy within the Context of General 
International Law and International Trade Law particularly Regional Integration Law 
16 Signed in Nassau, the Bahamas, on 5 July, 2001 
 
 
economic development, and being mindful that disputes among States could 
affect adversely the desired goals, affirmed in the Preamble to the RTC that 
“the employment of internationally accepted modes of disputes settlement in 
the Community will facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the 
Treaty.” They also considered that “an efficient, transparent, and 
authoritative system of disputes settlement in the Community will enhance 
the economic, social and other forms of activity in the CSME . . . .”  The 
scope of this system is considerably wider than the Treaty of 1973.  Whereas 
resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
1973 Treaty was the sole responsibility of the Heads of Government,17 and 
its mandate was to consider whether “any benefit conferred on a Member 
State or any objective of the Common Market was being or may be frustrated 
if no satisfactory settlement is reached between the Member States,” the 
scope of the RTC disputes settlement was widened to include, inter alia,  
allegations that an actual or proposed measure of another Member State is 
or would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Community. 
 
  Although the RTC’s disputes settlement regime is addressed 
extensively in Chapter 9, the Conference of Heads of Government still 
retains the right to consider and resolve disputes between Member States18 
in much the same way as it did under the 1973 Treaty. 
   
  With the commitment to deepen regional economic integration 
by avoidance of disputes among Member States, the RTC advocates recourse 
to several internationally accepted modes of dispute settlement, namely, 
                                       
17 Article 19 of 1973 Treaty 
18 Article 12(8) 
 
 
good offices, mediation, consultations, conciliation, arbitration and 
adjudication.19  Any of these modes of settlement may be utilised by Member 
States to resolve disputes without prejudice to the exclusive and compulsory 
jurisdiction of the CCJ in the interpretation and application of the RTC. 
 
  The mandate of the CCJ in the exercise of its exclusive 
jurisdiction is not confined to hearing and determining disputes between 
Member States or between Member States and the Community, but includes 
determining referrals from national courts of Member States,20 and of 
immeasurable importance, hearing applications by private persons, whether 
natural or juridical, who may be allowed with special leave by the Court, to 
appear as parties in proceedings before the Court subject to specific 
conditions being satisfied.21 
 
  The delivery of advisory opinions concerning the interpretation 
and application of the RTC also falls within the remit of the CCJ’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, the opinions being delivered only at the request of Member 
States parties to a dispute or at the request of the Community, possibly 
through the Secretary General.22  
 
  In spite of the Court’s compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine disputes between Member States, alternative dispute resolution 
remains the primary objective of Member States of the Community.  
 
                                       
19 Article 188 
20 Article 214 of the RTC; Article XIV of the CCJ Agreement. 
21  Article 222 of the Treaty; Article XXIV of the Agreement. 
22  Article 212 of the RTC; Article XIII of the CCJ Agreement. 
 
 
  The desirability of employing and exhausting all avenues for 
dispute resolution between Member States is emphasised in the mandatory 
language of the RTC which enjoins Member States to proceed expeditiously 
on agreement for modes of settlement and implementation of such 
settlements.23 In fact, Chapter 9 addresses Disputes Settlement in Articles 
187 through 223 including those Articles relative to the CCJ.24  
Significantly, in relation to the settlement of private commercial disputes 
among Community nationals as well as among Community nationals and 
nationals of third states, Article 223 of the RTC obligates Member States to 
encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration and other modes of 
alternative disputes settlement “to the maximum extent possible”, and so 
does Article XXIII of the CCJ Agreement which specifically refers to the 
settlement of international commercial disputes.  Additionally, the 
mandatory nature of Article 223.2 of the RTC ensures that each Member 
State provides appropriate legislative procedures to ensure observance of 
arbitration agreements, and for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards in such disputes.    
 
The Basseterre Treaty 
  The Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (the Basseterre Treaty) must also be considered.  It was signed into 
force on 18th June, 1981 by the Heads of Government of the Eastern 
Caribbean States,25 the main goal being cooperation in strengthening links 
                                       
23 Article 189. 
24 Articles 211 – 222. 
25 Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines. 
 
 
by unified efforts and resources.  The principal institution, “the Authority” 
comprises the Heads of Government of the Member States.  In the relevant 
provision of the Treaty on the settlement of disputes arising between 
Member States, if such disputes cannot be resolved amicably by direct 
agreement, the Treaty mandates that they be submitted to a Conciliation 
Commission by either party upon an undertaking to accept the conciliation 
procedure.  Any recommendation of the Conciliation Commission is final 
and binding in sharp contrast to the relevant provisions of the RTC. Of 
interest, all Member States of this Treaty are now Member States of the RTC 
thereby creating an overlap situation giving rise to the availability of two 
options. 
 
  Although the main thrust of this paper is the dispute resolution 
regime of the RTC, other issues connected with the CCJ in its principal role 
of interpreting and applying the RTC will be addressed.     
 
  It is convenient at this juncture to discuss the compulsory and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CCJ.  Member States under Article 216 of the 
RTC (Article XVI of the CCJ Agreement) agree to recognise as compulsory, 
ipso facto and without special agreement, the original jurisdiction of the 
Court.26  In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, Article 217 of the RTC  
(Article XVII of the CCJ Agreement) enjoins the Court to apply such rules of 
international law as may be applicable, and under Article 221 of the RTC 
                                       
26 Judgment of the CCJ in Trinidad Cement Ltd. v The Caribbean Community  [2009]CCJ2(OJ)) and comment that 
“by signing and ratifying the Revised Treaty and thereby conferring on this Court ipso facto a compulsory and 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Revised 
Treaty, the Member States transformed the erstwhile voluntary arrangements in CARICOM into a rule-based 
system, thus creating and accepting a regional system under the rule of law.” 
 
 
 
(Article XXII of the CCJ Agreement) the judgments of the Court shall 
constitute legally binding precedents for parties who appear before it unless 
such judgments have been revised in accordance with Article 219 of the RTC 
(Article XX of the CCJ Agreement).  It is apposite at this point to raise the 
following question. 
 
Is the jurisdiction of the CCJ really exclusive? 
  The late Professor Ralph Carnegie27 in a learned presentation at 
a Faculty Workshop Series of the Faculty of Law of the University of the 
West Indies on November 25, 2009, but which it seems was never published 
or disseminated up to the time of his death and is available only as a draft, 
posed the question – “How Exclusive is ‘Exclusive’ in Relation to the Original 
Jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice?”  Several very interesting 
and thought-provoking opinions were expressed by him, a few of which will 
be advanced post mortem and attempts at answers given.  
 
  Article 211 of the RTC having conferred on the CCJ compulsory 
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the   
interpretation and application of the RTC limited that jurisdiction by the 
opening words of the Article “Subject to this Treaty,” and which is 
circumscribed similarly in Article XII of the CCJ Agreement.  Many opinions 
have been proferred as to the import of these words.  Justice Duke Pollard, 
former Judge of the CCJ, posited the view that the said circumscription has 
extremely important implications for the interpretation of the RTC, and 
                                       
27 History Graduate of the University College of the West Indies, Rhodes Scholar, Graduated with First Class 
Honours in Jurisprudence from Oxford University, served as Fellow and Tutor in Law at Jesus College; founding 
Professor in Faculty of Law, Cave Hill Campus, UWI.  Died on 7th January, 2011. 
 
 
opined that the phrase “subject to” introduces a dominant provision followed 
by one or more subservient provisions as lawyers familiar with the 
elementary principles of drafting (as he is) must appreciate.28 The 
conclusion he arrived at was that consequently the compulsory and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CCJ cannot be construed to take precedence 
over other relevant treaty provisions, for example, the wide-ranging disputes 
settlement regime of Chapter 9 of the RTC, particularly Article 193.1 which 
imposes what may be regarded as a mandatory obligation on Member States 
in a dispute to enter into consultations.  This is concluded by the use of the 
word “shall” in the Article instead of “may.”  Realistically only failure of the 
consultative process permits Member States in a dispute to resort to 
arbitration or adjudication.  
   
  The exclusivity of the CCJ’s jurisdiction under Article 211 of the 
RTC and Article XII of the CCJ Agreement becomes more complex from 
Professor Carnegie’s point of view.  In his discourse referred to earlier his 
reasoning raised the following queries about what he termed “the non-
curial” modes of dispute settlement being those distinguishable from the 
CCJ’s adjudication: 
 
“If the non-curial modes in Chapter 9 RTC are among 
the intended reference of the qualification ‘subject to 
this Treaty’   in Article 211 RTC, there is a problem in 
that recourse to those modes is not only also stated by 
Article 188.1 RTC to be ‘subject to the provisions of this 
Treaty’, but additionally, is under Article 188.4 RTC 
                                       
28  Presentation at the ACP-EU International Conference on 21st May, 2008 in Brussels, Belgium. 
 
 
‘[w]ithout prejudice to the exclusive and compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty under Article 211.’  So the 
Chapter 9 non-curial modes are not modes which 
prevail over the exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of the 
‘subject to the treaty’ qualification in Article 211.1 RTC.  
How then can the non-curial modes have any 
application at all, if the CCJ’s jurisdiction is exclusive 
and, by virtue of the ‘without prejudice’ phrase, 
overriding also?” 
 
  An analysis of Professor Carnegie’s queries seems to suggest 
that since the non-curial modes of dispute settlement in Chapter 9 of the 
RTC are themselves circumscribed under Article 188.1 which begins 
“Subject to the provisions of the Treaty,” and additionally under Article 
188.4 are “without prejudice to the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court”  they can be overridden, and are not modes which prevail over 
the CCJ’s exclusive jurisdiction; hence the jurisdiction of the Court is not 
circumscribed by the use of the words “Subject to this Treaty.”  
 
  Professor Carnegie theorised that the text excludes one 
hypothetical possibility, this being, that the other modes of settlement are 
only available if the CCJ consents to their operation.  He enlarged his theory 
by stating that the choice to use one or more of the non-curial modes lies 
with the parties to a dispute, and when a Member State has recourse to a 
dispute settlement against another Member State, Article 189(a) mandates 
that they proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views.  Professor Carnegie, 
however, suggests such a requirement seems superfluous if a non-CCJ 
 
 
mode is available only at the option of the CCJ.  In support of this theory he 
drew attention to the fact that there is no reference in the RTC text to an 
exchange of views being required when a private sector party (meaning a 
private individual or a private corporate entity) brings a claim before the 
CCJ under Article 222 of the RTC or when CARICOM is a party to the case.  
He alluded to the fact that no reference was made in any of the cases 
decided by the CCJ in its original jurisdiction to any obligation on any of the 
parties to  initiate an exchange of views.  He concluded that this is arguably 
sub silentio confirmation that the exchange of views requirement does not 
apply to an Article 222 matter. In response it is suggested that   
consideration must be given to the fact that   although no provision for this 
has been made to date in the Original Jurisdiction Rules, parties are not 
prohibited after a court proceeding is launched to engage in an exchange of 
views without prejudice to its continuation provided such a course is 
accepted by the Court.  
  Article 187 of the RTC gives rise to an interesting array of 
reasons for non-curial modes of dispute settlement concerning the 
interpretation and application of the RTC.  While Article 187(a) refers to 
allegations that an actual or proposed measure of another Member State is, 
or would be, inconsistent with the objectives of the Community, and hence 
can be invoked only by a Member State, the other allegations may be 
invoked by private parties, for example, by natural or juridical persons 
under Article 222 or any other entity,29  and not excluding a Member State. 
 
                                       
29 TCL v CARICOM [2009] CCJ4 (OJ). 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier Article 188.1 lists the array of options for 
settlement of disputes available to any party. Article 188.2, however, 
provides that where the dispute is not settled either party may have 
recourse to another mode except arbitration or adjudication which can be 
regarded as rule-binding procedures.  One may hazard a guess that the 
reason for excepting these two modes is that parties should endeavour to 
exhaust fully during the early stages of dispute resolution non-contentious 
modes of settlement before resort to the modes of arbitration or adjudication 
which could sometimes be contentious. Professor Carnegie posits the view, 
which is arguable, that the utilisation of the non-curial modes may be 
treated as preliminary procedures only and which may be followed by later 
reference to the CCJ at the option of any of the parties.  
 
  It is interesting, however, to analyse Articles 188.3 & 4.  Article 
188.3 permits the parties to a dispute to agree on recourse to good offices, 
mediation or conciliation while a settlement is pending subject to the 
procedural rules applicable in respect of arbitration or adjudication. One 
possibility that suggests itself is that even after parties to a dispute have 
resorted to arbitration or adjudication a settlement may be envisaged, and 
recourse may still be had to the non-contentious modes of settlement.  
Needless to say this depends on whether the procedural rules applicable to 
arbitration or adjudication permit such a course.  
 
   Support for this opinion can be found in Sheldon McDonald’s 
treatise when he expressed the view with reference to Article 188.3 that it 
permits free choice, and allows parties to have negotiations even on the 
 
 
margins of the two exceptions of arbitration and adjudication; if the recourse 
to the other modes resolves the matter report to the arbitration panel or the 
Court could be sanctioned and reflect a binding resolution of the dispute.   
 
  Article 188.4 makes specific reference to the CCJ’s exclusive 
and compulsory jurisdiction under Article 211, and without prejudice to it, 
permits parties (by use of the word “may”) to utilise any of the voluntary 
modes of settlement giving rise to the query whether the jurisdiction of the 
CCJ can be utilised as a first or last resort.  
 
  Significantly by virtue of Article 12.8 of the RTC the Conference 
being the supreme Organ of the Community, may consider and resolve 
disputes between Member States, the language of which suggests that this 
may be another option available to Member States, and must be read in 
conjunction with Article 189 which mandates Member States to proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views on agreement on a mode of settlement. 
 
  Of some importance as well is Article 13 of the RTC concerning 
the Community Council of Ministers which consists of Ministers responsible 
for Community Affairs and any other Minister designated by the Member 
States in their absolute discretion.  The duties of the Council are defined in 
Article 13.4 of the RTC, and “without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing provisions”, include, inter alia, to “ensure the efficient operation 
and orderly development of the CSME, particularly by seeking to resolve 
problems arising out of its functioning, taking into account the work and 
decisions of COTED” (Article 13.4(f)), and to “receive and consider 
 
 
allegations of breaches of obligations arising  under this Treaty, including 
disputes between Organs of the Community” (Article 13.4(g)).    
 
  When one considers the options for the settlement of disputes 
arising between Member States the choice of good offices, mediation or 
conciliation seem to be unrestricted although subject to expeditious 
resolution.  Where, however, a requesting Member State alleges that the 
action taken by the requested Member State constitutes a breach of 
obligations arising from or under the provisions of the RTC consultations 
seem to be mandatory under Article 193, and such consultations must take 
place within 14 days of the request.  This seems to indicate the serious 
nature of breaches of Treaty obligations whether by Member States against 
other Member States or against individuals or entities of Member States as 
reflected in Article 187 of the RTC. 
 
   Justice Pollard in reference to Article 193 in his treatise 
mentioned earlier, opined that the requirement to settle a dispute 
concerning the RTC by consultation where both disputants so prefer would 
operate to displace the jurisdiction of the CCJ, and it hearkens back to the 
traditional and preferred mode of resolving disputes by states entities; in 
fact he concluded that since Member States are free to employ the broad 
range of other disputes settlement modes, it is a moot point how compulsory 
and exclusive is the jurisdiction of the CCJ in interpreting and applying the 
RTC.  It may be that, consultations apart, in disputes between Member 
States concerning allegations of breaches of obligations under the RTC, 
 
 
Article 12.8 (the Conference option) may be utilised notwithstanding the 
other options. 
  Professor Carnegie adverted to the fact that the CCJ has not 
had so far to address any issues pertaining to the dispute settlement 
function of the Conference, and opined that should this arise, it may 
perhaps be expected that “taking its cue from Article 12.8 RTC, the CCJ 
would show the kind of deference to the Conference that the International 
Court of Justice showed to the Security Council in the Lockerbie case.”30  He 
explained that in that case the ICJ held that invocation by the Security 
Council of its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
prevailed over other obligations of the parties to the case under other 
international agreements.  In the hypothetical instance before the CCJ, the 
express provision of Article 12.8 of the RTC makes the recommended 
deference easy to justify without reference to any overriding of treaty law.  
 
    Some concerns were raised by Professor Carnegie in relation to 
the   Competition Commission, the establishment, composition, functions 
and powers of which are defined in Articles 171-174 of the RTC. He 
described disputes which may arise between a Member State and the 
Commission as a “turf dispute” which under Article 176.6 may be referred to 
the CCJ by the Member State concerned.  He observed that the CCJ Rules 
do not refer to this procedure, and wondered where guidance on the 
procedure is to be found.  He pondered whether it may perhaps be inferred 
from the CCJ’s decision in Johnson v CARICAD31 that such proceedings 
                                       
30 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America 
31 [2009] CCJ 3 (OJ). 
 
 
would have to be treated as an action against the Community. No doubt 
Professor Carnegie’s conclusions were based on the assumption that the 
Competition Commission was an Organ or at most an Institution of the 
Community.  For this reason it is necessary to examine the functions of the 
Competition Commission and clarify some misconceptions.  
 
 The functions of the Competition Commission comprising seven 
members, a Chairman being one such member, include, inter alia, applying 
the rules of competition in respect of anti-competitive cross-border business 
conduct, promoting and protecting competition in the Community and co-
ordinating the implementation of the Community Competition Policy.  In 
determining anti-competitive business conduct which is addressed in  
Article 175 of the RTC, provision is made under sub-paragraphs 11 and 12 
for recourse to the CCJ by the Commission (11), and (12) by a party 
aggrieved by a determination of the Commission under exercise of its powers 
granted in Article 174.4.  Similarly, negative Clearance Rulings made by the 
Commission under Article 180 of the RTC are reviewable by the CCJ on an 
application by the Commission. 
 
  The relationship between the Competition Commission and the 
CCJ was defined and determined in the recent case of Trinidad Cement Ltd. 
v The Competition Commission32   where the Court held that the Commission 
enjoys full juridical personality making reference to the Agreement entered 
into between the Community, the Government of Suriname as the seat of 
the Commission and the Commission itself that the Commission “shall have 
                                       
32 [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ). 
 
 
full juridical personality”.33  The Court, in considering its competence to 
review the decisions of the Commission, concluded that there was no 
conduct or exercise of power on the part of a Treaty-created institution 
which could escape its judicial scrutiny due to the CCJ’s compulsory and 
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning the interpretation 
and application of the RTC as well as the Treaty’s normative structure 
geared at transforming the CSME into “a regional system under the rule of 
law.”   
  This may have provided answers to some of the queries raised 
by Professor Carnegie in his paper concerning the Competition Commission.  
It is an exercise in superfluity to emphasise that the Competition 
Commission is not an Organ of the Community, its powers and functions 
having been defined in Articles 173 & 174.  The Commission can carry out 
investigations and hold inquiries to determine anti-competitive business 
conduct by an enterprise. Article 175.11 empowers the Commission to apply 
to the CCJ for an order when an enterprise fails to take corrective action 
which the Commission had ordered. Similarly, a party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Commission can under Article 175.12 apply to the CCJ for a 
review of the decision; in fact the Commission itself can invoke the 
jurisdiction of the CCJ for a review of its own decision on an application for 
a negative clearance ruling when that decision was obtained by deceit or 
improper means.34 All of the above indicates that the Competition 
Commission enjoys full juridical personality, and has no “Organic” status 
                                       
33 Article XV of the Agreement signed in St. Vincent & the Grenadines on 13th February, 2007 
34 Article 180.3 
 
 
 
within the Community.  The Commission has formulated its own rules of 
procedure, and in the Original Jurisdiction Rules of the CCJ procedural 
rules have been formulated in relation to matters concerning the 
Commission; these include provision for service of documents on persons 
and organs within the Community , including COTED which may be affected 
or were involved.  
 
  In relation to Article 175.12 Professor Carnegie queried whether 
this provision permitting a party aggrieved by the Competition Commission’s 
determination of anti-competitive business conduct to apply to the CCJ for a 
review suggests inconsistency with the Court’s jurisdiction being original, 
and can be regarded as being more akin to a supervisory jurisdiction by way 
of judicial review. Again, the answer to this contention lies in the 
aforementioned dicta in the judgment of the Court which emphasised the 
exclusivity of the CCJ’s jurisdiction to scrutinise the conduct or exercise of 
power of any Treaty-created institution. This case was decided after 
Professor Carnegie’s death, and one can only surmise whether had it been 
decided in his lifetime it may have influenced his conclusions.   
 
    Although not directly connected to the RTC’s disputes 
settlement regime, it may be apposite to make reference to the referral 
provisions of the CCJ’s compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction35 and the 
delivery of advisory opinions (Article 212 of the RTC; Article XIII of the CCJ 
Agreement) referred to earlier.  Neither of these has been utilised since the 
inauguration of the CCJ in 2005 so there is no precedent for their 
                                       
35  Articles 211.1(c) & 214 of the RTC; Articles XII (c) & XIV of the CCJ Agreement. 
 
 
utilisation. The national courts of the Member States to the RTC whenever 
seised of matters which may concern the application or interpretation of the 
RTC are enjoined to stay completion of the matter until a ruling from the 
CCJ on the issue has been obtained. National courts were reminded of this 
in a recent case before the CCJ.36 Hypothetically, assuming a claim is 
brought by a private individual or entity  against a Member State which 
involves some provision of the RTC and a settlement is envisaged, it is 
suggested that wisdom should dictate that the proposed settlement be 
deferred until a definitive ruling on the interpretation and application of the 
RTC is obtained from the CCJ.  In like manner Member States involved in a 
dispute which can be resolved by mediation or consultation may seek an 
advisory opinion from the CCJ on the application or interpretation of any 
provision of the RTC before settlement of the dispute.  This may be advisable 
in order to test the legality of the proposed settlement. 
 
  Such an approach is discussed by Sheldon McDonald in his 
literary work37 where he stated positively that it is permissible for parties by 
prior action emanating from consultations to agree to be bound by such an 
opinion. He went on to state that in this way the parties may avoid 
contentious court proceedings, and as a corollary it may be an invaluable 
contribution to the building up of Community Law.  Having regard to the 
fact that the CCJ has not been as yet utilised in this regard this may be a 
long way off in becoming a reality.  
                                       
36 Hummingbird Rice Mills Ltd. v Suriname & The Caribbean Community [2012] CCJ1 (OJ) para. [26]. 
37 Ibid p 42. 
 
 
  More detailed consideration will now be given to settlement of 
disputes by arbitration.  Mention had been made earlier to Article 223 of the 
RTC and Article XXIII of the CCJ Agreement which by mandatory language 
suggest that arbitration be utilised as one of the primary modes of dispute 
settlement particularly those concerning private commercial transactions. 
Despite the fact that Article 204 of the RTC indicates arbitration as an 
option, the elaborate provisions in Articles 205 – 210 and 223 indicate that 
parties particularly where private commercial activity is involved should 
adopt this as their main form of settlement even above court adjudication. 
Provision is made for Third Party Intervention by a Member State who is not 
a party to a dispute (Article 208). 
  The importance attached to this mode of settlement is further 
highlighted by the mandate to each Member State to provide appropriate 
procedures in its legislation to ensure observance of arbitration agreements 
and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (Article 223.2).  
Credit is even given under Article 223.3 to a Member State which has 
implemented the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law as having complied 
with Article 223.2.  
  One can presume with some degree of certainty that the 
motivation for urging the timely settlement of private commercial disputes, 
whether regional or international, is to avoid the adverse effects which 
protracted delays in resolution of such disputes could have on the fragile 
 
 
economies of Member States as well as the resultant serious impact on the 
enhancement of the CSME; all of this is separate and apart from the drastic 
loss of confidence in the investment climate of the Region which may be 
engendered. 
Comparisons and Contrasts between the CCJ and the ECJ  
 
  An assessment of these two international courts may indicate 
that the Caribbean Court of Justice is likely to be to the Caribbean 
Community what the European Court of Justice is to the European Union 
particularly in relation to the creation of a Single Market among Member 
States.  In this regard certain provisions of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction 
mirror those of the ECJ.  The role of both Courts is a supervisory one 
charged with the responsibility of monitoring the application and 
implementation of economic treaties.  
  Justice Pollard, in a comparison between the two courts made 
the comment that the CCJ which in the exercise of its original jurisdiction 
as an international tribunal is considered in some quarters as the 
institutional centrepiece of the CSME, but unlike the ECJ it has no 
supranational competence, and is not integrated as an organ in the 
institutional arrangements of the Caribbean Community.  He posited the 
view that this was due in large measure to the dual status of the CCJ as a 
municipal court of last resort for most but not all members of the 
Community, and as an international tribunal for all members of the 
Community.38  
                                       
38 See “The CSME and the CCJ” a paper largely based on an article entitled The CSME, CCJ and the Private Sector 
which appeared in The Caribbean Integration Process: A People Centred Approach edited by K. Hall and M. Chuck-
A-Sang, Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, 2007, pp 24-47. 
 
 
  The issue of referrals from Member States is common to both 
Courts, but with different applicability.  The import of Article 214 of the RTC 
is similar to Article 234 of the Maastricht Treaty which brought into being 
the European Court of Justice.  In like manner if the issue of interpretation 
of the Treaty is raised before any court of a Member State, it may request 
the ECJ to give a ruling thereon.  Although at first blush the provisions may 
appear to be similar, there are some crucial differences. Whereas the 
language used in Article 214 of the RTC appears to be mandatory in that 
where a court or tribunal of a Member State when seised of an issue 
involving the interpretation or application of the RTC shall refer the question 
to the CCJ for determination, a court or tribunal similarly placed with 
interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty may, if it considers that a decision on 
the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, request the ECJ 
to give a ruling thereon.  Article 234 extends this further to provide for  
situations where there is a case pending  before a national court of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, that court or tribunal may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice.   
  Justice Pollard remarked on the difference between the two 
provisions by pointing to the fact that unlike the ECJ, the CCJ in cases of 
referrals from national courts or tribunals is competent to interpret and 
apply the RTC. Article 234 of the Maastricht Treaty provides only for an 
interpretation by the ECJ.  Justice Pollard went on to point out that despite 
obvious differences in the formulation of the referral provisions in the two 
regimes, their essential thrust is similar, namely, to ensure certainty and 
 
 
uniformity in the applicable law.  He theorised that in much the same way 
that the provision of Article 234 was credited with promoting social and 
economic cohesion in the European Union by allowing the ECJ to insinuate 
itself in the domestic law of participating states, such a role may be of even 
greater importance within the Caribbean Community where the prevalence 
of dualism and the non-applicability of the principle of direct effect 
aggravates the problem of establishing a uniform legal infrastructure in 
CARICOM.  
  Continuing the discussion on referrals or references to the ECJ 
by national courts or tribunals, the case of Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen39  
illustrates the basis on which a reference to the Court can be made when it 
noted that the Court has consistently held that it is solely for the national 
court to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, 
the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to give its judgment, 
and consequently if questions submitted to the Court concern the 
interpretation of Community law, the Court, is in principle, obliged to give a 
ruling.   
  Unfortunately, to date the CCJ has not had the opportunity to 
make any ruling on referrals, but optimistically this may change in the near 
future.   
  The RTC in Article 221 (Article XXII of the CCJ Agreement) 
sought to ensure consistency in the judgments of the CCJ by providing that 
they shall constitute legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings 
                                       
39 Case C-79/99, judgment given on 7/12/2000 
 
 
before the Court unless such judgments have been revised in accordance 
with Article 219. Consistency and uniformity in the application and 
interpretation of an economic treaty is a sine qua non for the development of 
confidence in tribunals and courts under whose mandate such 
interpretation fall.  National courts of the European Union have accepted the 
supremacy of European law affirmed by the ECJ to a large extent in certain 
areas of dispute, for example, sex discrimination.  In Costa v ENEL (ECJ 
Case 6/64) the ECJ established the principle of supremacy of Community 
law, a consequential result being that precedence must always be given to 
Community law over conflicting national law. 
  The CCJ in the recent case of Shanique Myrie v The State of 
Barbados40 availed itself of the opportunity to define the supremacy of 
Community law when it upheld the validity and applicability of a 2007 
Conference Decision of Member States permitting the right of entry of 
nationals of one Member State into another for a period of six months, this 
being an implementable decision at Community level, and therefore binding 
on all Member States without the need to be enacted domestically.  The 
Court went on to hold that if binding regional decisions can be invalidated at 
the Community level by the failure of a Member State to incorporate those 
decisions domestically, the efficacy of the entire CARICOM regime would be 
jeopardised; further, the certainty, predictability and uniformity of 
Community law would be destroyed.   
 
                                       
40 [2013] CCJ3 (OJ). 
 
 
The RTC and the WTO (World Trade Organisation) 
  Dispute settlement is regarded by the WTO which came into 
force in 1995 as the central pillar of international and multilateral trade, 
governed essentially by agreed procedures under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding agreed to by member states of the WTO.  
  Part Three of the RTC on SUBSIDIES embracing Articles 96 – 
116  covers every aspect of the imposition of subsidies under the remit of 
COTED, one of the Organs of the RTC, but Article 116.6 specifically provides 
that no Member State shall impose countervailing duties other than 
provisional countervailing duties without prior authorisation from COTED, 
and the determination and imposition of definitive countervailing duties 
shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. COTED’s authority seems to be 
limited to authorising only provisional countervailing duties. 
  The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(the SCM Agreement) concerns multilateral disciplines regulating the 
provision of subsidies and the use of countervailing measures to offset 
injury caused by subsidised imports, an Agreement to which all member 
states of the WTO are expected to adhere.  There is as a consequence a WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism which doubtless is utilised whenever the 
need arises. 
  It can be logically concluded that Article 116.6 was drafted in 
compliance with the WTO mechanism in mind and which may bind all 
 
 
CARICOM Member States as members of the WTO.  One can well 
understand why such disputes may not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
CCJ.  
Conclusions 
  The Preamble to the CCJ Agreement indicates that the 
Contracting Parties were “convinced that the Caribbean Court of Justice will 
have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean 
jurisprudence through the judicial process” with its establishment being “a 
further step in the deepening of the regional integration process.”  The 
Preamble to the RTC affirmed that “the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice is essential for the successful operation of the CSME.”  By 
this confident assertion the Regional leaders of the Community carved a 
niche for the CCJ to give effect to the traditions and mores of the people of 
the Caribbean Region through its judgments primarily in its appellate 
jurisdiction, though not exclusively so, and through its original jurisdiction 
blazing a trail through virgin territory of interpreting and applying a Treaty 
with the laudable objectives of enhancing “the participation of their peoples, 
and in particular the social partners in the integration movement.”  
  In the short and exhilarating experience of the Court the 
collective conclusion and prediction suggests that the jurisprudence deriving 
from its original jurisdiction will be advanced and developed primarily 
through disputes between natural and juridical persons and Member States 
of the Community rather than between the Member States themselves.    
This is due in large measure to the detailed Disputes Settlement Regime of 
 
 
Chapter Nine of the RTC discussed earlier which suggests exhaustion of the 
listed options of resolution before energetic recourse to the CCJ when 
disputes arise between Member States. One can only surmise whether this 
was the intention of the crafters of the RTC; only time will tell.   
 
The CCJ as a Catalyst for Change in the Administration of Justice 
   
  The CCJ in both its original and appellate jurisdictions has an 
obligation to foster and encourage the implementation and fashioning of 
alternative means of dispute resolution within the Region.  The continuity of 
an overwhelming backlog of cases hampering the efficiency and ability of 
national courts to deliver justice in a timely manner must be the compelling 
motivator for the regional establishment of centres providing alternative 
means of case disposal if the maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” is to 
be relegated to the dump-heap of history in a forgotten past.    
  Progress has been made in the Region as most national courts 
have embarked on some form of alternative dispute resolution. It is 
predicted that these small steps will develop exponentially throughout our 
Region in the short term as we stride resolutely forward in improving the 
delivery and quality of justice to the people of our Member States.  
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